Inhalt des Dokuments
Research interests of our group are covering monetary macroeconomics, financial crises, and experimental economics.
There are several reseach seminars at which we paricipate. For a full of economics reseach seminars in Berlin see https://bdpems.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/portal/content/research-seminars 
Here is a list of some of our current research projects:
Macroeconomic Consequences of Strategic Uncertainty
Standard macroeconomics assume that all agents' strategies are in equilibrium, which requires that agents know the strategies of others and choose their strategies by best responding to the strategies of others. Experiments show, however, that uncertainty about others' strategies matters for decisions and (i) leads to a selection of equilibria that are robust against or account for strategic uncertainty, (ii) may lead to out-of-equilibrium behavior without convergence to equilibrium, (iii) may lead to so-called sunspot equilibria, in which economic activity is driven by self-fulfilling beliefs.
We analyze ways to measure and model strategic uncertainty and its implications for equilibrium selection and economic activity. We are particularly interested in understanding the implications of strategic uncertainty on individual expectations and convergence towards rational expectations equilibria, on transmission channels of monetary policy, optimal communication by central banks, and on determinants and resolution of financial crises.
Regulation and Taxation of Financial Markets
This project is an integral part of the Collaborative Research Center "Rationality and Competition: The Economic Performance of Individuals and Firms", Sonderforschungsbereich TRR 190 , funded by the German Research Foundation, DFG. Principal investigators are Frank Heinemann at TU Berlin and Andreas Haufler at LMU München. A description of this project (in English and German) can be found here: SFB TRR Teilprojekt B 07 
Strategic effects of liquidity injections, lender-of-last-resort facilities and monetary policy responses to asset prices
This project is an integral part of the priority program on "Financial Market Imperfections and Macroeconomic Performance" (Schwerpunktprogramm, SPP 1578 ), funded by the German Research Foundation, DFG. Principal investigator is Frank Heinemann. A description of this project (in English and German) can be found here: Liquidity Injections 
Price Adjustment in Disequilibrium
How do prices adjust if markets are not in equilibrium? How do disequilibria spill over from one market to another? What are the implications for product markets if labor markets are not clearing or vice versa. How do exogenous restrictions on supply (or demand) of some products affect other markets? This research project builds up on disequilibrium theory and intends to use results from experimental economics in order to formulate an advanced theory of price adjustment.
Coordination Games: Equilibrium Multiplicity and Equilibrium Selection
Many macroeconomic theories have mutiple equilibria, often Pareto-ranked, so that coordination on the most efficient equilibrium is desirable. However, the efficient strategies may be risky ex ante, that is unless the strategies of other players are known. Experiments show us that strategic uncertainty may lead players to coordination on risk dominant rather than payoff dominant equilibria. The purpose of this research project is to model and test equilibrium selection and analyze conditions for coordination on efficient equilibria.
Aversion to Strategic Uncertainty: Measurement and policy Implications
Strategic uncertainty is the uncertainty that players face with respect to the strategies chosen by other players. While economic theory mostly applies equilibrium concepts like Nash or rational expectations equilibria that are based on the absence of strategic uncertainty, experiments show that real decision makers are sensitive to strategic uncertainty. Laboratory experiments have indicated that most humans waive a substantial part of their expected payoff in order to avoid that their payoff depends on the decisions by others, which is called strategic uncertainty aversion. This project aims at developing a method for measuring strategic uncertainty aversion, to find out how strategic uncertainty aversion is affected by the characteristics of the game, and to analyze by which means strategic uncertainty can be reduced. A description can be found here: ASUR